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Trying to make sense of the world and to classify it probably goes 
back as far as there have been systems for observing differences. The 
capacity to make distinctions is the first step towards sorting out, 
ordering and systematizing the world. Amoeba, which have no sen­
sory organs, no nerve systems or brain are nonetheless capable of 
recognizing whether there is nourishment near them or not. They do 
this by registering concentrations of matter in their environment, in a 
process of perception called chemotaxis.
Even simple surfaces of objects can generate distinctions by allowing 
a certain proportion of the wavelength of light to pass into their inte 
riors and be stored there in the form of warmth. We perceive the 
components of a light wave that a surface reflects into the environ­
ment as its colour.1 If we see colours, what we are observing is re|ec 
ted remnants reflected by closed bodies that have been sent on a 
journey out into the world again. We can’t see what is allowed 
through by the surfaces of bodies.
Networks or membranes are likewise simple ordering systems that 
create a distinction between objects that can pass through the mes 
because they are smaller than the mesh and objects that get stuck i
the net because they are too large. Sorting out objects into two dif­
ferent piles according to certain characteristics such as large/sma ,^ 
light/dark, coloured/black-and-white, beautiful/ugly, useful/useless 
and so on produces simple binary codes for dividing up the world.
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In principle, that means that the world itself is in a position to make 
distinctions, order and sort itself out. This generates the remarkable 
paradox that it seems as if the world were constructed to observe 
itself and make distinctions. In his book The Laws of Form, mathema­
tician and logician George Spencer-Brown draws attention to this 
fundamental connection resulting from any attempt to produce order 
or distinctions. The measuring process divides the world into two 
zones, a measured one and one that does the measuring. The latter 
part, which does the measuring, cannot in turn itself be measured.
'Let us then consider, for a moment, the world as described by the physicist. It 
consists of a number of fundamental particles which, if shot through their own 
space, appear as waves, and are thus (as in Chapter 11), of the same laminated 
structure as pearls or onions, and other wave forms called electromagnetic which 
it is convenient, by Occam's razor, to consider as travelling through space with a 
standard velocity. All these appear bound by certain natural laws which indicate 
the form of their relationship. Now the physicist himself, who describes all this, 
is, in his own account, himself constructed of it. He is, in short, made of a conglo­
meration of the very particulars he describes, no more, no less, bound together 
by and obeying such general laws as he himself has managed to find and to 
record. Thus we cannot escape the fact that the world we know is constructed in 
order (and thus in such a way as to be able) to see itself. This is indeed amazing.
Not so much in view of what it sees, although this may appear fantastic enough, 
but in respect of the fact that it con see at all. But in order to do so, evidently it 
must first cut itself up into at least one state which sees, and at least one other 
state which is seen. In this severed and mutilated condition, whatever it sees is 
only partially itself. We may take it that the world undoubtedly is itself (i.e. is 
indistinct from itself), but, in any attempt to see itself as an object, it must, 
equally undoubtedly, act so as to make itself distinct from, and therefore false 
to, itself. In this condition it will always partially elude itself. It seems hard to 
find an acceptable answer to the question of how or why the world conceives a 
desire, and discovers an ability, to see itself, and appears to suffer the process.'2
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Measuring the world therefore not only makes one ordering system 
visible but also makes another one disappear. That is the paradox 
and at the same time the presumption of measurement. A measure­
ment is a form that always has two sides, i.e. a measured inside and 
an unmeasured outside. The unmeasured outside is the point where 
the world disappears, where it becomes invisible, unobservable, con­
cealed, latent and excluded. Every measurement thus has its costs 
and its benefits. The costs reside in the price of blindness or, perhaps 
one should say, the bedazzlement you pay to get the result. The 
price consists of what is excluded by the classification system—what 
it makes invisible, veils, covers and does not name. The benefits on 
the other hand comprise the classification system and systematiza­
tion that you can achieve via the measuring procedure. One of the 
first to grasp this fundamental connection between measured results 
and the measuring process in theoretical terms as well was physician 
and philosopher Werner Heisenberg. In his early writings on the 
uncertainty principle, he addresses this problem clearly. The
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measured result that can ever have been independent of a particular 
measuring procedure.3
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Every form of measuring thus sorts the world. It divides it into two 
parts, an ordered and a measured part, and an unordered and chaotic 
part. The outer side of order, measurement, and systematization is 
disorder, indeterminateness or chaos. The outer side of reason is 
madness.'* Every attempt at systematizing an order has to be seen 
against the background of this excluded element. That means that 
measurements, orders and systematisations not only make 
something visible or produce insights but also make the world disap­
pear on the outside, making it invisible, indeterminable, immeasu­
rable and unsystematic. The question therefore is which side of order 
we ourselves are on or want to be on. Do we operate only on the 
inside of determination, i.e. in the system of measurement in the 
zone where order, system and the power of reason prevail, or do we 
wander as intellectual nomads outside the disciplining and discipli­
ned power of the scientific set-up? Thus, in the matter of the way the 
world is ordered, it always involves the boundary, crossing it, chan­
ging sides, reconnoitring and where the boundaries are anyway. What 
happens if I cross it as an artist? What happens if I cross it as a sci­
entist? These are questions that are widely discussed today under 
the heading of artistic research.5
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If we consider this topic as applied to the world of museums and ask 
how museums generate scientific connections, we likewise have to 
engage with this distinction between fading in and fading out, 
making visible and causing to disappear. With their ordering systems, 
museums make just as much visible as they cause to disappear. They 
suppress certain forms of knowledge as much as they bring out 
others and make them visible. Ultimately, an ideological critique of 
museums needs to be attached to that.
The Universalmuseum Joanneum was founded in 1811 by Archduke 
Johann for the purpose of making learning easier and stimulating the 
population’s desire for knowledge. It was a creature of the Enlighten­
ment and part of the education of mankind, the process of civilizing 
the wild barbarian into an honnete homme.6 The museum put 
together by the Archduke was to be handed over to the estates ‘for 
educating the youth of Styria, expanding knowledge, encouraging 
hard work and the industry of the population of Styria.’7
Museums as institutions turn the diversity of the world into museum 
exhibits. They take objects out of the river of life and the perishabi­
lity of matter and make them permanent. If you consider the whole 
process of making objects into museum exhibits, it begins with
collecting. This may happen from personal preference, as with the 
various wunderkammer of Archduke Ferdinand II of Tyrol at Schloss 
Ambras near Innsbruck, Emperor Rudolph’s curio cabinet in Prague or 
Prince Paul Eszterhazy I’s at Forchtenstein in Burgenland. But it also 
can be done by means of a systematic collection policy based on an 
explicit collecting philosophy that sets up or develops precise criteria 
for which things should be selected for the museum and acquired 
from the profuse diversity of a period.Once the artefact is acquired, 
there follows the process of archiving, classifying, systematizing and 
setting it up as a museum exhibit. The historic importance of an 
object turned into a museum piece is the result not solely of the fact 
of its preservation or collection but only of its having been investiga­
ted for museum or scientific purposes as well.
This includes the scientific documentation of the object. It is divided 
into primary and secondary documentation. The primary documenta­
tion includes documentation of the find, morphological description 
and the systematic classification in accordance with rules of the rele­
vant source science and the classification principles of the collection 
field concerned.8
Over and beyond scientific documentation, the museum piece has on 
the one hand to be preserved for posterity for the long term as cultu­
ral heritage. On the other hand, it has to be presented for public edi­
fication and put on show. It has therefore in turn to be looked after 
for conservation purposes and where necessary given restoration 
treatment. Moreover, the object has to be presented, published and 
made available to the public. These twin tasks of the museum- 
long-term preservation and the presentation of artefacts—set up 
an irresolvable conflict that has to be dealt with over and again 
between conservationists and curators. Only through the procedure 
of presentation, interpretation and publication can a museum object 
be experienced and passed on in the whole breadth of its historic 
authenticity.9
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How does knowledge arise in a museum? Measuring, classifying, sys­
tematizing, archiving and storing do not in themselves constitute 
knowledge. That is often misunderstood. Naturally, knowledge from 
the field of scientific understanding goes into archiving the object. 
But that does not mean that the knowledge deployed for investiga­
tion automatically becomes visible in exhibiting objects to the public. 
For something to become knowledge, several conditions need to be 
met in principle. A complete memory process has to go through three 
phases, namely encoding, storage, and retrieval. Only when archived 
objects are fetched out of the depository of the museum and thus 
made topical again do they become the object of knowledge-forming 
processes in the present time. If a living person of the present day, 
qua contemporary, connects with artefacts of the past, knowledge 
may arise. To be able to answer the question of how knowledge is
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ledge more precisely and distinguish it from related concepts such as 
opinion, conviction or belief.
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On the whole, we may distinguish two different forms of knowledge. 
The first may be designated as ‘knowing how’ or ‘ability to’. This is 
sometimes called procedural or implicit knowledge.10 Implicit know­
ledge functions unconsciously, automatically and habitually. It is a 
form of knowledge that is available to the person concerned without 
attention, cognitive effort or consciousness. Generally it cannot be 
formulated in language, or only with difficulty. It is the knowledge 
that an artist has. If a person can do something, i.e. has an ability to 
do something particularly, for example, ride a bike, play the piano or 
draw a portrait, we may justly say of this person that he or she 
‘knows’ how to ride a bicycle, play the piano or draw portraits. Ability 
is an example of implicit knowledge that is not necessarily subject to 
linguistic formulation.
The second type of knowledge can be designated as ‘knowing that' or 
simply ‘knowing'. This kind of knowledge is often also called proposi­
tional or explicit knowledge. Explicit knowledge is conscious. It can 
be formulated in language, and is subject to the constraints of atteri' 
tion. It is an attentive knowledge whose bandwidth and resources are 
limited by the involvement of consciousness. If someone can express 
in speech what he knows and if what he says is true, we may say of 
this person that he ‘knows’ something. ‘Knowing’ is an example of 
explicit, propositionally formulated knowledge articulable in lan­
guage.
7
As sharper conditions of truth exist for the term knowledge than for 
opinions or convictions, it is sensible to draw a line between this 
term and other concepts similar to it in meaning.11 Concepts such as 
belief, conviction, opinion or experience represent concepts that are 
closely related to the concept of knowledge but not identical to it- 
Knowing comes with stricter conditions of justification and substan 
tiation.
In Theaetetus, Plato defines knowledge (episteme) as true opinion 
(doxo) combined with an explanation (logos).12 The difference bet­
ween subjective opinion and objective knowledge is linked to the 
capacity for explanation. This sounds very modern since, in the Bo 
der Erkenntnis, Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela likewise 
associate scientific insight with the capacity to supply an explana­
tion.13 According to American philosopher Edmund Gettier, if some ^ 
one can justify his opinion and deliver a well-founded explanation. 
has not only a subjective opinion, but also objective, true knowle b 
of the world.14
Now, does this also apply to visual or artistic knowledge? Here, we 
need to first clarify what we mean by ‘visual’, ‘shaping’ or ‘artistic’ 
knowledge. By way of an initial definition, it will have to suffice that 
this is understood as including all forms of knowledge production, 
distribution and reception that can be generated, organized and dif­
fused with the aid of sight.
Specific, visually based knowledge would thus be, in contrast to a 
visual idea, conviction or opinion, the capacity to explain and justify 
something subjectively imagined by visual, design or artistic 
means.15 Do we need to make concessions here in the justification 
and claim to truth? I do not think so. Combining a visual idea or 
notion with an artistic styling allows it to become substantiated 
visual, designed or artistic knowledge about the world. Is that 
enough for a definition? That pushes the problem on to what we 
mean by ‘justified’. What are the conditions that make an explanation 
‘justified’?
Many modern definitions of knowledge are based in principle in one 
form or another on this early definition of Plato’s. Thus, in his early 
essay Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, Edmund Gettier for 
example distinguishes three different conditions for knowing. A given 
person (5) knows that something (P) is the case if
i. P is true,
ii. 5 believes that P is the case, and
iii. 5 is justified in believing that P is the case.16
Here again, knowing is linked with concepts of truth, opinion and jus­
tification. In all cases, it is clear that a necessary and (possibly) ade­
quate condition of knowing must be connected with the concepts of 
conviction, justification and truth. What does it mean that someone 
is justified in believing that something is the case? When is anything 
ever justified? What do the procedures of justification, substantia­
tion and the discovery of truth involve? How can we talk of substan­
tiation or justification—and above all justifying it to whom?
Information and knowledge are frequently confused with each other. 
In itself, information is not knowledge. It is a necessary preliminary 
stage that under certain circumstances can become knowledge. Only 
once information has been imparted to others can it become know­
ledge. Private information or information not imparted that is not 
made publicly available is not knowledge but a secret. Knowledge is 
always socially formulated if it is knowledge. It is imparted, shared or 
communicated. In Latin, communicare means to have something in 
common or to share something. The shared involvement is the decis­
ive interface and the social basis whereby information becomes pub­
lic, shared knowledge. Information becomes knowledge via a social 
process of publication. And it is justified vis-a-vis others in the social
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implicit as to explicit knowledge. Ability is justified via the quality of 
its results, i.e. ultimately via an aesthetic judgment, whereas propo­
sitional knowledge on the other hand is justified by the judgment of 
truth.
8
Any attempt to classify something generates a world therefore, as 
we have seen. The construction of an ordering system is an attempt 
to reduce uncertainty and achieve a high degree of predictability. The 
invention of an ordering system however at the same time also gene­
rates a statement about the way the world is or is not. Any attempt 
to design a classification system thus has ontological implications.
It is the basis of a perspective or an outlook. That is precisely where 
works of art play a decisive role in the construction of ordering sys­
tems and the generation of ontology. Pictures of the world become 
images of the world, by generating and producing and making visible 
world situations via their specific structure. Works of art that pro­
duce ordering systems or develop systematic structures create an 
ordered image of the world.
The exhibition looks at the way contemporary art designs ordered 
systems. The diversity of reality is collected in an artistic fashion, 
ordered, archived and systematized. This is done according to artistic 
and not scientific rules. The effect of this is to produce an artistic 
view of the world, an ontology of art, that is possible only in art and 
via art itself in the first place. That means that ultimately the diffe­
rences between scientific and artistic knowledge systems are a 
meta-theme of the exhibition. Artistic classification systems endea­
vour above all to facilitate an implicit, aesthetic experience of nexu­
ses in an ordering system in which on the one hand the world can be 
interpreted and understood as it appears to the artist in his work. On 
the other hand, however, the observer's self, which is part of the 
world, gains a better self-understanding of his personal, social and 
cultural identity.
Artistic ordering systems indicate from the other, unmarked outer 
side in what areas scientific ordering systems can cause reality to 
disappear. Artistic research can make visible what science neglects, 
forgets, excludes or suppresses, and turns it into a visible form as an 
aesthetic counter design, counter image on autonomous reality 
structure. Aesthetic and scientific ordering systems mutually com­
ment and criticize each other. Aesthetic ordering systems of art chab 
lenge scientific ordering systems’ power of definition. Scientific orde- 
ring systems in their turn attack aesthetic ordering systems as 
unjustified structures of world, and question the truth of their form- 
Both ordering systems thus have a critical relationship to distinc­
tions. They expose the blindness of the other discipline as a kind of 
bedazzlement and flag the ideological claim of measurement and 
ordering as presumption and regulation. In this mutual and critical
relationship, art brings out the relativity of science, and science the 
relativity of art. Both social systems deconstruct the absoluteness of 
their respective ideological claims to power as presumptuous claims. 
(Translation: Paul Aston)
